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Local Determinants of Crime: 
Do Military Bases Matter?
Abstract
Using a unique panel dataset, we estimate the impact of the military base realign-
ments and closures (BRACs) in Germany on the intensity of criminal activity surround-
ing the base. We use a ﬁ  xed-eﬀ  ect model to account for time-invariant unobservables 
in our panel of 298 military bases for the period 2003–2007. We also take advantage of 
geographic information system software to mitigate estimation issues arising from the 
spatial nature of the dataset. Estimation results are presented for total crime and four 
other subcategories: breaking and entering, automobile-related crime, violent crime, 
and drug-related crime. The estimates indicate that there is no eﬀ  ect of BRACs on cri-
minal activity surrounding the base. We also conﬁ  rm existing ﬁ  ndings in the literature 
on the determinants of crime.
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: H56, K42, R19
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Against the background of the transformation of the German Federal Defense Forces, we ex-
amine the socioeconomic impact of military bases on the surrounding communities. In partic-
ular, we focus on the effects of military bases and military personnel on the level of crime of
the surrounding area. The current realignment of the German Federal Defense Forces gives us
the unique opportunity to use a natural experiment to estimate the causal impact of military
base closures on crime.
Crime is a complex social phenomenon that deserves special focus from social scientists.
Various aspects of crime have been examined by psychologists, sociologists, lawyers, political
scientists, and, beginning with the work of Becker [1968] and its extension by Ehrlich [1973],
by economists as well. Applications of economic theories of rational choice tend to explain the
observed trends in deviant behavior quite well.1
The reason we expect a relationship to exist between military bases and the crime rate
is that young men commit the majority of crimes (for a variety of reasons explained in Sec-
tion 2), and young men comprise the majority of the military-base population. The German
armed forces (Bundeswehr) is composed primarily of men: women comprise a mere 9 percent.2
Moreover, there is evidence that conscription could lead men to commit crimes in the future,
and Germany is among the few remaining countries in Western Europe to rely on compul-
sory military service to staff its armed forces. For example, using a natural experiment in
the assignment of draft-eligibility status through a lottery system in Argentina, Galiani, Rossi
and Schargrodsky [2010] ﬁnd that participation in military service increases the likelihood of
having a criminal record in the future, particularly when the crime involves weapons. It is
therefore conceivable that the composition of personnel inside a military base could have an
impact on the level of crime observed around the base’s surroundings.
Much of the attention to studies of crime is justiﬁed by the sheer magnitude of criminal
activities and its associated social costs. Take the case of a burglary. One needs to keep in mind
that the costs of such a legal breach is not borne simply by the victim. There are also law-
enforcement costs related to determining and apprehending the suspect, as well as the cost of
1See, e.g., Levitt [1998], Grogger [1998], Jacob and Lefgren [2003], and ¨ Oster and Agell [2007].
2Bundeswehr, “Starke Truppe – Immer mehr Frauen entscheiden sich f¨ ur die Bundeswehr” [Strong force: more
andmorewomenoptfortheBundeswehr], January11, 2010. AccessedSeptember2, 2010. http://www.bundeswehr.
de/portal/a/bwde/streitkraefte/grundlagen/frauen_in_der_bw.
4having police personnel in the ﬁrst place to prevent such crimes. Upon arrest, the legal system
alsocomesintoplay: lawyers’feesmustbepaidaswellasjudges’salaries. Injurisdictionswith
juries, the opportunity costs of members of the jury must also be taken into account. Moreover,
there is the expected response of the victim and her neighbors, who will now presumably
undertake more security measures such as installing electronic anti-burglary systems or safer
windows. Considering the number of crimes committed every year, the associated annual total
social cost would be staggering—and this is even without acknowledging the non-pecuniary
costs of victimization, such as psychological stress. As a rough measure, Table 1 presents the
direct cost of crime as esimated by the Federal Criminal Police Ofﬁce in Germany.
TABLE 1
COST OF CRIME (GERMANY, 2001–2009)
Year
Amount As share of
nominal GDP











Bundeskriminalamt, 2009 and Statistisches
Bundesamt Deutschland, 2010.
Despite having one of the lowest crime rates—even for Western European standards—
the federal government in Germany has been consciously addressing the issue of criminality
within its borders. The contribution of this study is to examine the effects of the programmed
militarybaserealignmentsandclosures(BRACs)inGermany—inparticular, theeffectoncrim-
inal activity surrounding the base.3 Reducing crime is a matter of public policy, and any initia-
tive that contributes to this goal, whether inadvertently or deliberately, requires careful study
to guide policymakers. Within the context of the on-going massive reorganization of the Ger-
man armed forces, it becomes necessary to evaluate the potential effects of BRACs not only on
defense and strategic grounds but also on outcomes that are perhaps less obvious to the casual
observer. Accounting for the hidden costs and beneﬁts of such a reorganization is therefore of
3Paloyo, Vance and Vorell [N.d.] examine the more obvious economic impacts of such base closures.
5paramount importance in order to avoid basing policy decisions on incomplete information.
Inthisregard, therelationshipbetweenmilitarybasesandtheleveloflocalcriminalactivity
is murky, and one for which there is a dearth of empirical evidence. While the overall impres-
sion gleaned from press reports, particularly from the US, is one of elevated crime within the
surrounding community owing to the presence of a base4, academic accounts are often more
sanguine. Raphael and Winter-Ebmer [2001], for example, argue that while reduced military
expenditure may increase social friction by causing unemployment, it has no immediate im-
pact on crime once other factors, such as demographic composition and alcohol consumption,
are controlled for. A case study by Thanner [2006] ﬁnds local residents in Maryland even de-
riving a sense of security from the base and a perceived increase in crime following its closure,
attributing this to the loss of the base’s deterrence effect.
To contribute to this issue, we assembled data from the Federal Criminal Police Ofﬁce
(Bundeskriminalamt), Federal and State Statistical Ofﬁces (Statistische ¨ Amter des Bundes und der
L¨ ander), and the Federal Ministry of Defense (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung). The econo-
metric problem is that we cannot observe the counterfactual situation, i.e., we do not know,
how crime rates would be if a base would not have been present in the community. The clo-
sure and realignment procedure which started in 2001 gives us a unique opportunity to over-
come the identiﬁcation problem, as it provides us with a natural experiment where some bases
are shut down solely due to military reasons and requirements without regard to potential out-
comes at the community level. A standard ﬁxed-effects regression model is used to account for
residual concerns about the potential endogeneity of BRACs, although, as will be emphasized
later in Section 5, there is substantial evidence to suggest that planned BRACs were unrelated
to the outcome variables of interest. Furthermore, we estimate our regression models over
data that have been transformed with geographic information system (GIS) software. More
explicitly, we create buffer zones that surround each base to deal with issues associated with
using regional data based on politically-delineated borders.
To preview our results, we ﬁnd that the base realignments and closures had no signiﬁ-
cant effect on total crime around the periphery of the base. This result holds across different
categories of crime and over varying sizes of the surrounding buffer zone. We conclude that
4Watson, Bruce, “High crimes: military towns are among the country’s most dangerous”, Daily Finance,
November 16, 2009. Accessed October 5, 2010. http://goo.gl/2BkK.
6concerns about changes in the level of criminal activity are unwarranted when weighing the
costs and beneﬁts to the local community of military base closures.
2 Young men and crime
By and large, crime is disproportionately commited by young men. There are a variety of
reasons for this phenomenon, including economic ones. For example, when the economy is
in recession, one of the areas of the labor market that is typically and severely affected is the
segment populated by young, unskilled labor. For instance, given the existing employment
laws in Germany, it is easier for ﬁrms to shed themselves of younger workers with shorter
tenure. Conscripts—usually young men below the age of 25—are also generally earning less
than what they could be earning in the civilian labor market. This reduced earnings capacity in
the legal labor market may tip the balance between licit and illicit activities towards the latter,
making it more proﬁtable for juveniles and young adults to engage in criminal activity.
The Bundeskriminalamt in Wiesbaden is responsible for publishing statistics on criminal ac-
tivity and is the source of our data on crime. In Figures 1(a) and 1(b), we plot the total amount
of crime and crimes against life known to law enforcement, respectively, for Germany for the
period 1993–2009 and disaggregated by the sex of the offender. With respect to both categories,
the number of male offenders dominate the number of female offenders, and even more so
when one looks at crimes against life (Straftaten gegen das Leben).
Figures2(a)to2(d)showtheshareofoffendersbyagegroupforbothtotalcrimeandcrimes
against life and separately calculated for men and women. For both sexes, young people (those
below 21 years old) commit a substantial part of total crime (about 25 percent). The percentage
is somewhat lower for more violent crimes, such as crimes against life. For those under 25,
their share of total offenses hovers a little below 40 percent for both men and women.
Taking into account that criminal activities are, for the most part, supplied by young men,
it is therefore worthwhile to ask whether a concentration of such a group, for instance, in a
military base, would have an impact on crime in the surrounding community. In terms of
convictions for crimes committed by employees of the Bundeswehr (among others, conscripts,
ﬁxed-term soldiers, and professional soldiers), we obtained data from parliamentary inquiries
7FIGURE 1

































































































































(b) Crimes against life
SOURCE.—Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik: Bundeskriminalamt, 2009.
8FIGURE 2
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(d) Crimes against life, female offenders
SOURCE.—Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik: Bundeskriminalamt, 2009.
9in 2006 and 2008, which are presented in Table 2.5 Here, we see that the trend in violent
crimes committed by employees of the Bundeswehr seems to follow a similar pattern depicted
in Figure 1(b). We take advantage of structural reforms, described in depth in the next chapter,
being undertaken in the German Federal Defense Forces to examine the relationship, if any,
between the presence of a military base and criminal activity surrounding the base.
TABLE 2
CONVICTIONS FOR VIOLENT CRIMES OF MILITARY PERSONNEL
Year
Number of convictions
Murder Manslaughter Sex crime Violent crime
1990 0 3 35 764
1991 2 0 33 620
1992 1 4 33 634
1993 4 1 31 634
1994 0 1 77 719
1995 0 0 28 649
1996 4 3 18 513
1997 1 2 25 507
1998 1 0 26 483
1999 1 1 28 586
2000 2 1 29 480
2001 1 0 18 354
2002 1 2 36 369
2003 2 0 35 339
2004 1 1 32 345
2005 1 0 34 266
2006 0 1 38 281
2007 1 1 28 262
NOTE.—The convictions may refer to offenses committed while not
associated with the Bundeswehr.
SOURCE.—Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 16/3168, 16/10164.
3 The transformation of the German armed forces
For Germany, the threat of a border invasion has all but dissipated. This is due to a num-
ber of factors but primarily because the Cold War has ended, and the European Union has
established itself as a viable political and economic agglomeration of countries. The security
threats faced by Germany (and many other countries in the Western world) now come from
substate and stateless terrorist organizations from as far away as Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The military deployment strategy that was appropriate to defend Germany against an inva-
5It is important to note here that the table lists crimes associated with members of the armed forces at the time
of the trial. These crimes were not necessarily committed while the accused was in the armed forces.
10sion originating from the other side of the Iron Curtain is now acknowledged to be insufﬁcient
to protect Germany and its citizens from organizations that threaten it today.6
In response to these changes, new Defense Policy Guidelines (Verteidigungspolitische Richt-
linien) were adopted by the German Parliament in 2003. These guidelines emphasized the
transition of the German armed forces from a territorial defense force into one that could be
deployed rapidly and internationally to address security concerns abroad. The task of the
Bundeswehr now involves “multinational conﬂict prevention and crisis management opera-
tions” while everything else “not conducive to this goal is of secondary importance.”7 The
results of such a transformation of the Bundeswehr are evident in the contribution of Germany
to multinational military operations. For instance, the Commander of the Regional Command
North of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan is German. Next to
the US and the UK, Germany is the largest contributor of military personnel to the ISAF. This
represents a dramatic shift in Germany’s security policy.
Before the new Defense Policy Guidelines, however, Germany was already embarking on
the path to rationalize the Bundeswehr. This is embodied in the proposal of the Federal Ministry
of Defense called the Departmental Deployment Concept (Ressortkonzept Stationierung), which
was adopted in 2001. This new deployment plan involved a substantial military drawdown,
including the reduction of military personnel and the reduction of the military bases located
within Germany. The program, which spans the period 2003–2011, dictates the closure of 187
bases and the reduction of personnel in 177 other bases. With this planned reorganization, the
federal government ultimately intends to reduce the total number of active bases from 575 in
2003 to 388 in the year 2011.
More recently, the current Defense Minister, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, has proposed a
plan to even more drastically reduce the size of the Bundeswehr. From its current complement
of 245,000 soldiers, zu Guttenberg intends to cut it down to 163,500 over the next few years.
Theplanalsoincludesthesuspensionofcompulsorymilitaryserviceandthetransformationof
the Bundeswehr into a professional army composed of an all-volunteer force, which is presum-
6To be fair, such an invasion cannot be completely ruled out. Therefore, the Bundeswehr is being transformed
today with this possibility taken into account, which means that should such a “conventional attack” become
imminent, the armed forces can be reconstituted quickly to respond to and neutralize the threat. The whole point
of the new defense concept can be seen as one that emphasizes ﬂexibility of the Bundeswehr to respond to multiple
threats.
7Bundeswehr, “The Bundeswehr on a new course”, February 28, 2005. Accessed September 2, 2010. http://
tinyurl.com/bw-new-course.
11ably more effective. The plan also includes raising the average number of military personnel in
a base to 900, which means the realignment of personnel and the closure of redundant bases.8
The impetus for this new proposal from the Federal Ministry of Defense is the global eco-
nomic and ﬁnancial crisis that erupted in 2007. To cope with the crisis, Germany embarked
on policies that stimulated aggregate demand. However, such policies, of course, exert pres-
sure on a country’s budget. Today, Germany must endure some expenditure compression to
maintain ﬁscal balance. To contribute to this effort, the Defense Ministry and zu Guttenberg
has come up with their proposal, which aims to save e8.3 billion over the next four years.
Abolishing conscription alone will save about e500 million per year.9
For some bases, downsizing the military complement might prove difﬁcult. Consider the
top 10 Gemeinden (municipalities or towns) by military personnel presented in Table 3. In 2003,
the base in Koblenz employed 8,830 persons, which represented about 8 percent of the popula-
tioninthatareain2003. However, inthesameyear, theaveragemilitarycomplementforabase
is about 324 individuals. Thus, to achieve Minister zu Guttenberg’s target, the realignment of
personnel will have to be substantial.
TABLE 3




2003 2007 2003 2007
Koblenz Koblenz 8,830 8,830 0.0819 0.0832
D¨ usseldorf D¨ usseldorf 3,020 3,020 0.0053 0.0052
Hammelburg Bad Kissingen 2,490 1,830 0.0228 0.0172
Penzing Landsberg am Lech 2,360 2,360 0.0215 0.0208
Sigmaringen Sigmaringen 2,200 1,670 0.0164 0.0126
Strausberg M¨ arkisch-Oderland 2,200 2,200 0.0115 0.0115
Regensburg Regensburg 2,140 2,140 0.0167 0.0162
Stetten am kalten Markt Sigmaringen 2,080 2,080 0.0155 0.0157
Memmingerberg Unterallg¨ au 2,036 0 0.0150 0.0000
Kappeln Schleswig-Flensburg 1,950 0 0.0098 0.0000
SOURCE.—Stationierungskonzept der Bundeswehr 2004.
8M¨ uller, Albrecht, “ChangescomingasBundeswehrfacesbudgetcuts”, DefenseNews, May27, 2010. Accessed
September 3, 2010. http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4646605.
9Joyner, James, “Germanycan’taffordmilitaryconscription”, AtlanticCouncil, July29, 2010. AccessedSeptem-
ber 3, 2010. http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/germany-cant-afford-military-conscription.
12TABLE 4
TIMELINE OF BASE CLOSURES BY FEDERAL STATE
Federal State Bases Number of base closures by year Bases closed
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Bayern 50 02276 1 7
Nordrhein-Westfalen 43 01663 1 6
Schleswig Holstein 39 03425 1 4
Rheinland-Pfalz 36 00197 1 7
Niedersachsen 35 00326 1 1
Baden-W¨ urttemberg 29 00035 8
Hessen 23 02124 9
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 19 01004 5
Brandenburg 13 02110 4
Th¨ uringen 6 00002 2
Saarland 4 00100 1
Sachsen 1 00001 1
Total 298 0 11 19 32 43 105
SOURCE.—Stationierungskonzept der Bundeswehr 2004.
4 Data description
The dataset used in our analysis contains 298 bases, of which 105 were eventually closed.10
Table 4 presents a timeline of base closures by federal state. The number of base closures per
year was increasing since the start of the program and culminated in 2007, when 43 bases were
closed. Bayern had the most number of bases at 50 and also the most number of base closures
at 17.
The data on crime were obtained from the Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik published annually
by the Federal Criminal Police Ofﬁce [Bundeskriminalamt 2009].11 Apart from the total crim-
inal offenses known to law enforcement, the publication also has crime disaggregated by the
type of crime. Other socioeconomic variables were drawn from the Federal and State Statistical
Ofﬁces [Statistische ¨ Amter des Bundes und der L¨ ander 2008]. All data is recorded at the Kreis
level (NUTS 3), which is an administrative region in Germany with an average area of 814 sq.
km. Information pertaining to the military bases was collected from the Deployment Concept
of the Federal Armed Forces of Germany [Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2004]. The
location information of the bases are provided at the Gemeinde level (LAU 2, formerly NUTS
10Missing information in any of the covariates used later in the regression analyis necessitated dropping certain
bases from the dataset.
11The crime statistics are collected by the German Federal Police. It is possible that the ruling government may
have an inﬂuence on how and which type of crimes are recorded. However, we do not feel that this is signiﬁcant
enough to change any of our results.
135), which is smaller than the Kreis to which it belongs. Each Gemeinde is located in only one
Kreis (i.e., the former’s border does not cross the latter’s).
The classiﬁcation of criminal offenses into various categories is done by the Federal Crim-
inal Police Ofﬁce. In this study, we use the following speciﬁc categories: (i) total crimes
(Straftaten insgesamt) comprise all crimes but without offenses against residence, asylum, or
free-movement-of-persons regulations (for instance, staying illegally in Germany, having no
passport, etc.); (ii) drug-related crimes (Rauschgiftdelikte) are all direct offenses related to il-
licit drugs: selling, buying, possessing with intent, as well as indirect offenses like robbery
and breaking and entering to gain access to drugs or to ﬁnance a drug addiction, and driving
under the inﬂuence of drugs; (iii) violent crimes (K¨ orperverletzung) are murder, manslaughter,
rape, assault, threatning with assault or bodily harm, hostage-taking and in general all violent
exchanges between persons, normally with intent; (iv) breaking and entering (Wohnungsein-
bruchdiebstahl) includes breaking and entering, stealing or its attempt, and all related offenses,
like damaging windows, doors, etc.; (v) stealing from cars (Diebstahl in/aus Kraftfahrzeuge)i s
actual stealing of cars and stealing from cars with intent (but not related to drugs; otherwise,
it would be recorded in drug-related crimes).
In general, violent crime is reserved for more serious cases. The categories are exclusive,
i.e., crimes are not counted in more than one group. If a person commits a combination of
crimes, say, runningoversomeonetogetmoneyfordrugs, themostseriousoffenseisrecorded.
Typically, when a violent crime is committed together with a property crime, the event is
counted under the latter category.12 The list of crimes in the dataset is not exhaustive, and
in all cases, the sum of the different crime variables that are available does not equal the total
number of crimes for a particular area.
The data are spatial in nature, which we take into account by transforming the data ﬁrst
before assembling and preparing it for estimation. The transformation involves the use of GIS
software to create buffer zones—circular areas with the base at its center—that surround a base
and which take into account the information from the surrounding Kreise. To do this, we ﬁrst
draw a buffer zone around the centroid of the Gemeinde where the base is located.13 The area of
overlap for each Kreise contained in this buffer zone is calculated and then divided by the total
12The most prominent example is theft in combination with assault, which is recorded as a property crime.
13We therefore assume that the base is located in the center of a Gemeinde.
14area of the buffer zone. The resulting ratio is used to weight the information assigned to that
Kreis. This allows us to compute a weighted sum that summarizes the available information
from the surrounding Kreise of a particular base. This approach, also favored by Banzhaf and
Walsh [2008] for applications to US census data, incorporates the information from the home
and surrounding Kreise. It ameliorates some of the difﬁculties associated with the so-called
modiﬁable areal unit problem [Openshaw 1984], such as the use of varying and arbitrarily
sized spatial units of analysis.
Consider, for instance, the case depicted in Figure 3. Here, the Gemeinde (crosshatch pat-
tern) is located at the edge of its home Kreis (gray). If we were to take into account—using the
method described above—that it shares the border with two other Kreise, we would calculate













where i and j are the Kreis (where the base is located) and buffer zone, respectively. For our
purposes, we set the radius of the buffer zones to 12 km and 20 km. This allows us to roughly
determine how far from the centroid the effect, if any, travels.
One drawback in processing the data this way is the assumption that the surfaces are
isotropic, i.e., that the magnitude of the effect emanating from the centroid is invariant with
respect to direction. This is problematic when the politically delineated borders are the result
of natural features such as mountains and rivers, over which the effects may not necessarily
propagate as easily as over plains. Therefore, we also estimate our model using untransformed
data, i.e., without the buffer-zone transformation, to check the robustness of our results.
While we have every reason to believe that the decision pertaining to which bases will be
closed is based purely on strategic grounds, we nevertheless perform an equality-of-means test
between areas where bases closed and areas where bases stayed open to show that these bases
do not differ in their observed characteristics. This implies that, at least in terms of the ob-
servables, the places with base closures are comparable to those places without base closures.
We perform the test for two years: speciﬁcally, 2003, where the bases are ﬁrst observed in the
dataset, and 2007, where they are last observed. The results are displayed in Table 5. They
indicate that there is no substantial difference between the areas where a base closed and the
15FIGURE 3
GIS-BASED CALCULATION OF THE VARIABLES, 12-KM BUFFER
NOTE.—This base is located in Hammelburg, Bad Kissingen in the state of Bayern.
16areas where bases remained open, which makes a comparison between the two groups more
credible.
5 Estimation strategy and results
To identify the impact of adjustments in the size of military bases, including closures, we esti-
mate the following regression model:
lnyit = α + δDPit + β′xit + θ′zt + eit, (1)
where yit is a generic outcome variable (here, total crime and its subcategories) for unit i in year
t, DPit is the number of military personnel in thousands (Dienstposten), xit is a vector of control
variables, zt is a vector of unit-invariant year ﬁxed effects, and eit a stochastic disturbance term
with the usual properties. The coefﬁcients α, δ, β, and θ are a set of parameters and parameter
vectors to be estimated. The coefﬁcient of interest is δ, which represents the causal effect of
BRACs on criminal activity surrounding the base.
We exploit the panel structure of the dataset by augmenting Equation (1) with a time-
invariant and buffer-speciﬁc (or, in the case of the untransformed data, Kreis-speciﬁc) ﬁxed
effect:
lnyit = α + δDPit + β′xit + θ′zt + φi + eit. (2)
The term φi represents unobserved community-speciﬁc characteristics that affect the outcome
variable but do not change over time. For instance, certain geographic characteristics are cap-
tured by φi. Allowing for the possibility that this term is correlated with eit, we proceed to
apply a ﬁxed-effect transformation to the data to eliminate any residual biases.
As noted in the introduction, one important institutional aspect is that the decision to close
or downsize a military base was made purely on strategic grounds that were unrelated to the
intensity of criminal activity surrounding the selected base. As opposed to the US experience,
where the execution of the base closures was substantially inﬂuenced by the demands of the
local communities in which bases were located [Brauer and Marlin 1992], the military draw-
down in Germany was not altered by popular or political considerations. The planning period




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18base closure was taken back or altered. This peculiar aspect of the implementation of the De-
ployment Concept of the armed forces in Germany enables us to recover the causal impact of
BRACs.
The outcome variables used in this study are the following: total crime, breaking and en-
tering, automobile-related crime, violent crime, and drug-related crime. These are all loga-
rithmized so that the coefﬁcients can be directly interpreted as semi-elasticities. The control
variables contained in xit are an indicator variable that equals 1 for East Germany and 0 oth-
erwise (this is eliminated in the ﬁxed-effects model through the within transformation), real
GNP in million euro (lagged one year), the share of the unemployed in the community, the
share of foreigners in the community, the share of young men (aged 15–25 years old) in the
community, household disposable income relative to the national mean (lagged one year), and
population in ten thousands. All control variables are measured at the level of the Kreis.
In light of the seminal studies of Becker [1968] and Ehrlich [1973], we hypothesize that
variables that increase either economic well-being or the likelihood of arrest serve as deter-
rents to crime. More precisely, anything that increases the returns to licit activities relative to
illicit activities should reduce the propensity to commit crime. These include real GNP and
relative disposable income. Conversely, variables that undermine social cohesion or economic
security are hypothesized to increase the crime level, such as the share of foreigners and of the
unemployed. In addition, we expect positive relationships between (i) the share of foreigners
and crime and (ii) the share of young men and crime owing to a higher incidence of economic
duress and exclusion from the labor market within these groups. Being located in East Ger-
manyis alsohypothesizedto beassociatedwith higherlevelsof crimegivena sustainedperiod
of depressed economic conditions in that region. Finally, as large populations have generally
been found to be associated with higher crime, we expect a positive coefﬁcient for this variable
[United States Department of Justice 2009].
Estimates of the coefﬁcients based on Equations (1) and (2) are presented in Tables 6 and
7, respectively. Both tables use the GIS-transformed data with the 12-kilometer buffer. The
appendix presents results using a 20-kilometer buffer as well as the untransformed data.
Based on OLS regressions, we note that the presence of military personnel has no evi-





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20drug-related crimes, with a point estimate [standard error] of 0.041 [0.022]. Speciﬁcally, the
coefﬁcient suggests that a 1,000-person increase in military personnel is associated with a 4.1-
percent increase in drug-related crimes—a seemingly small effect that, as presented below, is
not robust to the inclusion of ﬁxed effects. Of the remaining coefﬁcient estimates, the majority
that are statistically signiﬁcant have signs that are consistent with expectations based on the
existing literature. Economic well-being, as measured by real GNP and relative disposable
income, is negatively associated with crime, while higher unemployment has a positive asso-
ciation. Also conﬁrming expectations, regions with a higher share of foreigners have higher
crime levels. [Entorf and Spengler 2000]
The ﬁxed-effects estimates presented in Table 7 mitigate biases arising from time-invariant
unobservable variables that are contemporaneously correlated with the error term. On the
whole, the qualitative ﬁndings do not vary markedly. With regard to military personnel, the
results conﬁrm the impression gleaned from the OLS estimates that this variable is not signiﬁ-
cantly correlated with crime. The most notable discrepancy is seen for the coefﬁcient estimate
for the share of young men, which now has the expected positive coefﬁcient in each of the
models.
6 Conclusion
The ongoing reorganization of the German armed forces is arguably the most massive recon-
ﬁguration of the country’s military since World War II, with potentially profound implications
both geopolitically and at the local level in communities where military bases are located.
Among the effects plausibly instigated by a base closure is a change in the intensity of crimi-
nal activities. To the extent that the personnel who populate the bases are largely comprised
of young men—the demographic segment most prone to criminal activity—it is conceivable
that the closures would reduce crime rates. Given the substantial ﬁnancial and psychic costs
of crime, such an outcome would register as a clear beneﬁt to communities otherwise con-
cerned about the economic impacts of the closures. This paper has attempted to empirically
address this issue by assembling a panel dataset that links regional crime rates to military base
complements and socioeconomic variables.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22ﬁed elsewhere in the literature, including the population, unemployment rate, the presence
of young men, and measures of local economic well-being, we ﬁnd no evidence for an associa-
tion of crime with the military bases. This conclusion holds over different estimation methods
and different scales of analysis.
In deriving policy implications from these ﬁndings, we would avoid making claims about
any relationship between criminal behavior and military service at the individual level; such
questions could only be addressed with micro-level data. Nevertheless, as a matter of regional
public policy, our ﬁndings strongly suggest that base closures or the reallocation of military
personnel across bases, will have no effect on the crime level in the communities affected.
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A.1 Supplemental regression tables
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